From the beginning
SocratesListen, then, while I take the argument up again from the start. Are the pleasant and the good the same?—Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed.—And should we do the pleasant for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant?—The pleasant, for the good’s sake.—And the pleasant is that by whose coming to be present we feel pleasure, and the good is that by whose presence we are good?—Certainly.—But surely we are good, both we and all the other things that are good, when some virtue has come to be present?—It seems to me necessary, Callicles.—But surely the virtue of each thing, of a tool and of a body, and again of a soul and of every living creature, does not come to be present in the finest way at random, but by arrangement and rightness and the art that has been assigned to each of them. Is that so?—I, for one, say so.—So the virtue of each thing is something that arrangement has arranged and ordered?—I would say so.—So it is a certain order, coming to be in each thing—each thing’s own—that makes good each of the things that are?—I think so.—And so a soul too that has its own order is better than a disordered one?—Necessarily.—But surely the one that has order is orderly?—How could it not be?—And the orderly one is temperate?—Inescapably.—So the temperate soul is good. I, for my part, have nothing to say besides this, my dear Callicles; but if you have, teach me.
CalliclesGo on, my good fellow.