Two points in dispute
SocratesIsn’t it, then, that earlier on we had it agreed, by most people and by you as well, that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it?
PolusYes.
SocratesBut now, at any rate, it has shown itself worse.
PolusSo it seems.
SocratesThen would you accept the worse and the more shameful rather than what is less so? Don’t hesitate to answer, Polus: you won’t be harmed at all. Rather, offer yourself nobly to the argument, as to a doctor, and answer; and say yes or no to what I ask.
PolusNo, I wouldn’t accept it, Socrates.
SocratesAnd would any other human being?
PolusI don’t think so—not according to this argument, at least.
SocratesThen I was telling the truth when I said that neither I nor you nor any other human being would accept doing injustice rather than suffering it; for it is in fact worse.
PolusSo it appears.
SocratesSo you see, Polus, that when refutation is set beside refutation, the two are nothing alike: all the others agree with you except me, while for me you are enough, one man alone, agreeing and bearing witness; and I put the question to the vote of you alone and say goodbye to the others. And let us leave that as it stands. After this, let us consider the second point we disputed: whether paying the penalty for doing injustice is the greatest of evils, as you supposed, or not paying it is a greater one, as I, for my part, supposed.