A donkey and a horse
PhaedrusHere is what I have heard about it, my dear Socrates: a future orator need not learn what is truly just, only what will seem just to the crowd who will judge. Nor need he know what is truly good or fine, only what will seem so. Persuasion comes from these appearances, not from the truth.
SocratesWe must not cast aside what wise people say, Phaedrus; we must consider whether there is something in it. Nor can we dismiss what you have just said.
PhaedrusYou are right.
SocratesLet us examine it this way.
PhaedrusHow?
SocratesSuppose I persuaded you to buy a horse to defend yourself against enemies, but neither of us knew what a horse was. I did, however, know this much about you: Phaedrus thinks a horse is the domestic animal with the longest ears—
PhaedrusThat would be ridiculous, Socrates.
SocratesNot yet. But what if I tried in earnest to persuade you by composing a speech in praise of the donkey, calling it a horse, and saying that this creature is worth keeping both at home and on campaign: useful in battle, able to carry equipment, and valuable in many other ways?
PhaedrusThen it would be utterly ridiculous.
SocratesBut isn’t a ridiculous friend better than a dangerous enemy?
PhaedrusIt seems so.